Introduction
Corporate governance has got more and more attention of the governments and has become a hot spot of academia since its birth in the 1970s. In the 1990s, however, the concentration has been found to be the dominant type for most countries in the structure of corporate ownership and control. In this case, only trace the company's ultimate property owners can we better understand the modern company ownership structure, control structure and the relationship with performance of corporate governance. has a certain level, despite there are incentive assessment indicators, the idea that the political field "seeking not accomplishment, but faults free" is more likely to affect their business decision whether to invest innovation or not, and compared with the actual controller of non-state, which is more inclined to take a conservative growth that is taking the existing way and abandon innovation, and even the management is willing to take an active management strategy, the introduction of innovative investment, but the drawbacks of a state-owned enterprise system hinder its implementation in a way. Therefore, we put forward the following assumptions:
H1: The nature of the actual controllers for state-owned company has no obvious effect on the innovation.
The actual controller ' s control degree and innovation input
For the actual controller of listed companies, the higher the control degree is, the more it has sufficient capacity and motivation to engage in corporate governance, thereby enhancing the role of internal governance of companies, which generally adopt and implement a proactive management strategy to promote the improvement of business performance.
If the actual controller has higher excess control degree, it would lack supervision and balance within the company, which easily leads to "large shareholders control", and along with the weak external governance is, the actual controller will be likely to erode corporate profits, deprive minority shareholders , interests, resulting in high agency costs and decreasing corporate performance. Meanwhile, the "predominant of one shareholder only one big share" results in a lack of democracy and scientificity, autocratic decision-making behavior in company ' s decision mechanism, which has a negative impact on innovation input, and The increase of equity degree of control of the actual controllers will widen the gap between the cash fluent and voting rights, and increase negative effect on innovation input.
So, we put forward the following assumption:
H2: The higher control degree of actual controller is, it would be unlikely to innovate input.
Two rights separation of actual controllers and innovation input
Actual controllers can adopt a variety of ways for the control of company, large shareholders through the pyramid shareholding structure, cross-shareholdings to Definition and interpretation of all variables are presented in Table 1 . Table 1 conown, concon), two rights separation (present in Table 1 sper variable); α (j) of equation (2) (1) - (3) to select one, the method is selective testing between any two: F-test is used to select between mixed model and fixed effects model; using LM test between mixed model and random effects model; using the Wald test between fixed effects model and random effects model.
Estimation results and analysis
Innovation input indicators are the explanatory variables, respectively, the nature of the actual controller, control degree and two rights separation, three control variables are regarded as dependent variables and used to conduct regression and selection of models, the results of selection are random effects models of the industry, the estimated results are shown in Table 2 . Table 2 Effect analysis of actual controller on innovation input significance level significantly, ** represents at 1% significance level significantly, * stands at 5% significance level significantly .
As can be seen from Table 2 , the three models have higher goodness of fit, we can see from wald 2 statistics that used to test the overall significance of the term, three equations in general are extremely significant. Next is the impact of the actual controller , s control degree on innovation input analysis. As can be seen from Again, let us analyze the impact of two rights separation on innovation input. As can be seen from Table 2 , the variable coefficient of two rights separation is estimated to be negative, but not significant.
Hypothesis H3 can , t come into existence.
Finally, it is the analysis of the impact of control variables on innovation input. We can see from the regression results of the control variables, the regression coefficient of company size variable log_aasets is significantly positive, the larger the company is, the more it is likely to promote innovation input, it is entirely reasonable, the larger the scale of enterprise is, the necessary financial resources and other conditions of innovation are also more likely to possess, with the expansion of business scale, enterprises have gradually entered a mature stage, and the high growth phase ends slowly, in order to maintain the level of development of enterprises, companies will introduce new technologies to promote innovation, thus enabling enterprises to maintain their vitality; the regression coefficient of asset-liability ratio alr is significant negative, the higher the debt ratio is, the less it is conducive to innovation, and the reason is that an increase in liabilities for the same company means fewer investment opportunities, thereby affecting the innovation input; the regression coefficient of the ratio of net profit and shareholders' equity roe is not significant.
Conclusions and recommendations
In this paper,we study the relationship between actual controller and innovation input from the perspective of theory and empiricism, the results show that: (1) the control degree of actual controller has a negative impact on innovation input; (2) the actual controller of the state-owned institution is not conducive to innovation input, and we also found: (3) the larger company size is, the more it is beneficial to innovation input, the higher the debt ratio is, the less it is conducive to innovation input. This study provide an important reference for the improvement of governance mechanisms that the actual controller of domestic listed companies.
